Abstract. Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a "reciprocity-compatible" contract enforcement device.
Introduction
Two features characterise many important economic relationships: They are contractually incompletely specified and they involve repeated interactions. A contract is incomplete if important aspects are not contracted in a way that can be verified by a third party (see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) ). The labour relationship is a prime example. In a typical labour contract performance may be observable but is to a large degree not enforceable. Facing this incompleteness, standard economic theory -at least for spot market transactions -yields a pessimistic prediction with respect to workers' performance: If effort is costly, workers will perform only at the enforceable level. Such behaviour is inefficient if the joint surplus of a better performance outweighs the additional effort costs. In this paper we present an experiment that allows us to analyse how social norms and repeated game effects can help to overcome this inefficiency.
Evidence in favour of the importance of social norms in labour relations comes, for example, from questionnaire studies with owners and managers of firms (e.g., Agell (1999) , Agell and Lundborg (1995) ; Bewley (1999) ). Controlled laboratory experiments have also established the importance of social norms for economic behaviour. In particular, there is mounting evidence from various contexts that many people are motivated by the norm of reciprocity. For example, Croson (1998) , Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1999) and Keser and van Winden (2000) show that in voluntary contribution games many people behave conditionally cooperative, i.e., they reciprocate others' contribution to a public good. 1 Particularly relevant for our present paper is the finding that social norms are an effective contract enforcement device in the presence of incomplete contracts (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) ; Güth, Klose, Königstein and Schwalbach (1998) ). By paying generous wages and thereby appealing to the workers' reciprocity, firms can induce performance above the enforceable level. Even in highly competitive institutions, market forces do not necessarily overrule the impact of norm-driven behaviour (Fehr and Falk (1999) ; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) ).
However, social norms are not the only remedy against inefficiently low performance. Another mechanism that has received attention is related to the long-term nature of most labour relations. Labour relations can rarely be viewed as spot market transactions where anonymous trading partners interact only once. Rather, employers and employees play a repeated game that opens up the possibility for implicit contracts and repeated game incentives, i.e., material incentives that arise because of reward and punishment opportunities due to a repeated 1 Many other studies report (some form of) reciprocal behaviour. For example, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) and Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996) find reciprocity in the "investment game"; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1996) in an extensive form game; Bolle (1998) in trust games; van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (2001) in a gift exchange game; Clark and Sefton (2001) in a sequential prisoner's dilemma; Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) in an experimental "lost wallet game"; and Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) in the "moonlighting game".
interaction. In this paper we analyse possible interaction effects of social norms and repeated game effects. We investigate these effects in a so-called "gift exchange game". In this sequential game "firms" make a wage payment to which "workers" react with an effort choice. If there is common knowledge that all players are selfish, inefficiently low effort choices are predicted but "fine-tuned", efficiency-enhancing gift exchanges are possible if subjects are motivated by reciprocity and/or are sensitive to repeated game incentives.
We first determine the empirical importance of reciprocity in a baseline treatment that excludes repeated game incentives. In this treatment, which involves a sequence of ten one-shot games (the "OS-treatment"), we investigate the occurrence of reciprocity with a matching scheme that ensures that a particular pair of subjects interacts only once. In our second treatment each pair of subjects is informed that they play a ten times repeated version of the same game. Since in this "Repeated Game-treatment" (called the "RG-treatment") a pair of subjects has a common history both reciprocity and some repeated game effects are possible. In Section 3 we will derive our respective behavioural hypotheses and research questions for both treatments.
Our data -described in Section 4 -reveal that both reciprocity and repeated game effects are clearly empirically relevant. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, i.e., a significantly positive wage-effort relationship. This relationship, however, is steeper in the RG-treatment than in the OS-treatment. Moreover, in the RG-treatment, effort levels are higher than in the OStreatment. A detailed analysis of individual behaviour sheds light on the reasons for this observation. In both treatments we find a majority of subjects who is genuinely motivated by reciprocity. Hence, many subjects' reciprocal motivation is left intact by the repeated game incentives. Moreover, in the RG-treatment there is a fraction of selfish subjects who imitate reciprocity. Put differently, the repeated game nature of the RG-treatment disciplines some selfish individuals who would -in the absence of repeated interaction -play uncooperatively (just as in the OS-treatment). As we will show in Section 5 these behavioural patterns are robust with respect to experience. Section 6 concludes.
Design, Parameters and Procedures
The constituent game. In both treatments the game under study is a version of the so-called "gift exchange game" (introduced by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) ). This is a two-player sequential move game that consists of two stages. In the first stage, a "firm" offers her "worker" a wage w. In the second stage, the worker can either accept or reject the offer. A rejection ends the game and results in zero profits for both players. Upon acceptance, the worker has to choose an "effort level" e. The higher the effort level, the higher are the associated effort costs, c(e). A firm's payoff function in terms of experimental money, p, is given by
where v represents an exogenously given redemption value.
A worker's payoff function in the gift exchange game is simply the difference between the accepted wage, w, and the incurred effort costs c(e) minus some fixed cost of 20:
Parameters and procedures. In the experiment, a firm's redemption value was v = 120. Wage offers had to be integers and obey the restriction w Î [20, 120] . The feasible effort levels and costs of effort in the experiment were as depicted in Table 1 . At the beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly allocated to their roles as "firms" and "workers", respectively. They kept their role throughout the whole experiment. There was an identical number of workers and firms. After subjects' roles were determined, workers and firms were located in two different, yet adjacent, large rooms in which they sat remote from each other. They were then given written instructions (see Appendix), which included a set of control questions. The experiments did not start until all subjects answered all questions correctly. Procedures and payoff functions were common knowledge, i.e., they were explained in the instructions and it was emphasised that they were the same for all firms and workers, respectively. Moreover, to ensure common knowledge, an experimenter summarised procedures and payoff functions. All experiments were hand-run. Firms made their wage offers by inserting them privately into their decision sheets (see instructions). Then an experimenter collected the wage offers and transmitted them to the workers' room. Here, only the worker matched with a particular firm was informed about "her" firm's wage offer. Following this the workers made their effort choices. Each firm was then informed about the effort choice of its worker. This ended a period. In total, there were ten periods. Identities of trading partners were never revealed and subjects were informed that they would never learn a trading partner's identity.
To isolate the effect of a repeated interaction, we implemented two main treatment conditions. The first we call "One-Shot" (OS) and the second "Repeated Game" (RG). Subjects only participated in one treatment. To check for the role of experience, in both main treatments we conducted additional trials with "experienced" subjects.
The One-Shot treatment. In this treatment, anonymous firms and workers were matched only once. This was made common knowledge by emphasising it in front of all subjects. Put differently, subjects knew that they were going to be re-matched in each repetition with a different firm or worker, respectively. A post-experimental debriefing confirmed the credibility of this procedure.
The Repeated-Game treatment. Contrary to the OS-treatment, an anonymous matched firmworker pair in the RG-treatment remained paired for ten periods. This was known to the subjects and verbally emphasised in front of all subjects. In other words, subjects knew that they were going to play a finitely repeated game with the same partner. Again, a post-experimental debriefing confirmed the credibility of this procedure.
The role of experience. In order to check the robustness of our findings with respect to experience and learning chances, we conducted two OS-sessions and two RG-sessions with experienced subjects. Subjects did not know in advance that they were going to play a second set of ten periods. All rules and parameters were exactly the same as in the preceding trials. In the "RG-experienced trials", new firm-worker pairs were formed and subjects were informed about that. In the "OS-experienced trials", as before, each firm was matched with the same worker only once, yet in a new sequence. Subjects were informed about that.
Behavioural Predictions
The OS-treatment. In the one-shot gift-exchange game the standard prediction under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and selfishness is easy to derive with backward induction: Since effort levels above the minimum are costly and workers are the second movers in this two-stage game, they will choose the minimum effort level. A firm's best response is to offer the lowest wage a worker is just willing to accept. Thus, the only strict subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is (w = 21, accept, e = 0.1) in each stage game. 2 Henceforth, this reference outcome will be called w* and e*, respectively. The resulting equilibrium payoffs are Paretodominated by more cooperative play. Thus, there is a considerable scope for cooperation to achieve a joint improvement. As mentioned above, previous research has shown that many people are reciprocally motivated and that w* and e* are likely not to be the prevalent outcome. Reciprocity is the nonstrategic conditional behaviour to reward kind acts (positive reciprocity) and to punish unkind ones (negative reciprocity) even if this is costly for the reciprocating subject. 3 In the rest of this paper we will operationalise reciprocity as follows:
Reciprocity Hypothesis:
Wages and effort levels are positively correlated, i.e., corr(w,e) > 0 holds.
Obviously, if firms pay "generous wages" (w > w*) and workers reciprocate by providing e > e*, joint improvements are possible.
The RG-treatment. In the finitely repeated gift-exchange game it is nearly impossible to derive a precise behavioural prediction; only some qualitative suggestions are possible. There are at least three reasons for this. First, if there are indeed some reciprocal people whose preferences are not completely captured by those induced in the experiment, we are likely to be in an incomplete information framework with different "types" as modelled, e.g., by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) . These authors have shown that even if there is only a small probability that the adversary is, e.g., a "tit for tat" player, cooperative play can be supported until the final period(s). Second, even with complete information but with multiple equilibria in the stage game, cooperative equilibria exist in which wages and efforts above w* and e* are observed for all but the last period (Benoit and Krishna (1985) ). Third, boundedly rational play may also lead to repeated game effects (Selten (1978) ; Selten and Stoecker (1986) ).
These sources suggest that we observe wages and effort levels that are at least as high as w* and e*. A "repeated game effect" can therefore be defined as the difference in observed behaviour in the RG-treatment as compared to our baseline OS-treatment. Hence, the change of reciprocity in the RG-treatment relative to the one observed in the OS-treatment determines the extent to which reciprocal behaviour is altered by some repeated game effects. We are in this paper not interested in dissecting the various possible sources and intricacies of repeated game effects. Our goal is to determine (i) the economic importance of a repeated interaction as a performance elicitation device and (ii) to see to what extent a repeated interaction alters reciprocal behaviour.
Results
In total, 116 subjects participated in our experiments. 60 subjects participated in the OS-, and 56 subjects in the RG-sessions. Our subjects were students (no economists among them) recruited from public lectures at various educational institutions in Vienna. None of them had ever participated in an experiment. The experiments lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours and subjects earned on average ATS 148 (about € 10.8) in the OS-sessions and on average ATS 161 (about € 11.7) in the RG-sessions. Hourly earnings in the experiments exceeded our subjects' opportunity costs of participating in the experiments.
Aggregate-level Observations
OS-treatment. Figure 1 presents the evolution of average wages and effort levels in the OStreatment. The most obvious result is that both average wages and effort levels clearly exceed the predicted levels, i.e., compared to the reference outcome (w* = 21 and e* = 0.1), we find a strong and systematic deviation. This deviation is persistent across all periods. Since firms pay higher wages than w* and workers respond by providing effort levels higher than e*, both trading partners heavily improve their payoffs compared to subgame perfect play. Whereas according to the latter a firm's period payoff in experimental money units is (120 -21)*0.1 = 9.9, their actual average payoff is 19.4, about twice as much. Workers earn a lot more as well. Given firms' wage policy workers experience a dramatic increase in their average period profits In keeping with previous observations, we find evidence in favour of our Reciprocity Hypothesis. Table 2 contains the results of a Tobit-regression with robust standard errors and with effort as dependent and wages as independent variable. In addition, we controlled for individual fixed effects and for repeated measurement (see Königstein (1997) ). The wage coefficient in the OS-treatment is positive (0.0069) and highly statistically significant (p < 0.0001). On average, workers provide higher effort levels, the higher the wages paid to them.
This positive wage-effort relation is of course exactly the reason why firms pay wages above w*.
Thus, reciprocity is capable of supporting cooperative play, thereby ensuring mutual benefits. Consistent with the one-shot interaction character of the OS-treatment, none of the period dummies is significantly positive at conventional levels. In contrast, the regression reveals a considerable degree of individual heterogeneity, since the worker dummies are jointly clearly significantly different from zero. We will return to this point in the next subsection. 
RG-treatment.
As in the OS-treatment both wages and effort levels exceed the subgame perfect levels in the RG-treatment. Three important observations can be made from Figure 1 . First, wages in all periods are rather similar between the two treatments. Second, the common history of a firm-worker pair in the RG-treatment actually matters. Workers' behaviour is more cooperative in the RG-treatment, i.e., for a given wage, they supply higher effort levels in the repeated game. As a consequence, relative to the OS-treatment, efficiency is enhanced through repeated play. 4 Third, there is a sharp drop in the last period. This sudden decline, however, does not result in effort levels of e*. Instead, effort levels fall close to the level in the OS-treatment, which was on average e = 0.41. Average effort levels in period 10 of the RG-treatment are (a) lower than in period 9 (contrary to wages; one-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests, p = 0.002 and p = 0.245, respectively) and (b) a bit lower than in the OS-treatment, but not significantly so (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.590, two-tailed).
The regression results reported in Table 2 suggest that the repeated interaction leads to a strengthening of reciprocity. The wage-effort relationship is indeed significantly steeper in the RG-treatment than in the OS-treatment. The corresponding regression coefficient is 0.0111, which clearly and significantly exceeds the coefficient of the OS-treatment. As in the OStreatment, the worker dummies are jointly significantly different from zero, which indicates substantial individual heterogeneity.
Analysis of Individual Behaviour
Can we trace back the findings at the aggregate level to individual decisions? For that purpose we analyse and classify all individual decisions of the subjects in the role of workers because only they could reciprocate to their firm's wage offer (at least in the OS-treatment). First notice that, because there are no repeated game incentives in the OS-treatment, we can identify the number of genuine reciprocators and selfish types, respectively. In the RG-treatment we should observe roughly the same number of genuine reciprocators than in the OS-treatment. Selfish subjects, however, may have an incentive to change their behaviour at least in the early periods of the repeated game. Since it was common knowledge that the repeated game will end after period 10, these selfish subjects, however, are predicted to choose e* by the last period, whereas a reciprocal subject may choose e > e*.
OS-treatment.
Our evaluation of reciprocal behaviour on an individual level rests on our Reciprocity Hypothesis:
Reciprocity Criterion 1 ("Reciprocity (OS)"). A person is classified as a reciprocal type if the Spearman rank correlation between wage and effort of that person is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
Alternatively, a worker is classified as a selfish type if she acts according to the subgame perfect prediction (most of the time). This leads to the following criterion:
Selfishness Criterion 1 ("Egoism (OS)").
A person is classified as a selfish type if she plays more than half of the time (i.e., at least 6 times) e* irrespective of the wage she receives.
5
See Table 3 for the details and Table 5 for a summary. According to Reciprocity Criterion 1, 53.3 percent behave reciprocally. Fewer workers act like homo economicus. According to our Selfishness Criterion 1 ("Egoism (OS)") 20 percent of the workers behave egoistically most of the time. One subject chose e* ten times.
RG-treatment.
Recall that in the OS-treatment we only observe genuine reciprocity, since there is no strategic reason to imitate reciprocity. Things look different in the RG-treatment. Here, a positive Spearman rank coefficient is no unambiguous indication for a genuine reciprocal type, for there exist strategic reasons to act reciprocally. Indeed, the share of workers with a significantly positive (at the 1-percent level) Spearman rank correlation coefficient increased from 53.3 percent in the OS-treatment to 67.8 percent in the RG-treatment (compare Tables 3  and 4 ). Hence, it seems that some reciprocity has been imitated. In order to distinguish genuinely reciprocal types in the RG-treatment from the "imitators" of reciprocity, we refine the reciprocity criterion of the OS-treatment. In order to be counted as a reciprocal type a worker must choose an effort level strictly larger than e* in the last period. With this requirement we can exclude subjects who play reciprocally only for strategic reasons for they will inevitably choose e* in the last period. Table 4 gives all details and Table 5 provides a summary. • (r) indicates a reciprocal type according to "Reciprocity OS", (e) indicates an egoistical type according to "Egoism OS". Worker 12 satisfies both criteria. However, since we employ a lower-bound criterion of reciprocal behaviour, we classify this worker as an egoist.
• No. of e = 0.1: includes all effort choices of 0.1 and the number of rejection decisions if the corresponding wage offer was 20 (rejection of wages > 20 cannot be explained with self interest).
• corr(w,e): indicates the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between wage and effort, * indicates significance at the 5-%-level, and ** at the 1-%-level. If the worker rejected a wage offer this was included in the calculation of the correlation coefficient in the form effort = 0.
Reciprocity Criterion 2 ("Reciprocity (RG)"). A person is classified as reciprocal if her
Spearman rank correlation between wage and effort is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level and if she chooses an effort level strictly larger than e* in period 10.
Notice that Reciprocity Criterion 2 is actually the same as Reciprocity Criterion 1 but adapted to the RG-treatment; this criterion provides a lower bound for the number of reciprocators, since it excludes the possibility that a reciprocal worker responds to a low wage with e = e*. Next we turn to our second selfishness criterion. • (r) indicates a reciprocal type according to "Reciprocity RG", (e) indicates an egoistical type according to "Egoism RG", (i) indicates an egoistical type according to "Imitation", (m) indicates a reciprocal type according to "Measure-for-Measure", (k) indicates an egoistical type according to "Imitate Measure-for-Measure". The measure-for-measure criteria are explained below.
Selfishness Criterion 2 ("Imitation"). A person is classified as an imitator if her Spearman rank correlation between wage and effort is positive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level and if she chooses an effort level of e* in period 10.
• e in t = 10: indicates the effort choice in the final period. If the wage offer was rejected in the final period we indicate it by "rej" and give the corresponding wage offer in parentheses. If no wage offer was made we indicate it by "no offer". Workers 16, 21, and 22 cannot classified according to our criteria. They are therefore excluded from this analysis and their ID appears in brackets.
• No of r: indicates the number of reciprocal actions of a worker, i.e., the two signs Dw and De are the same with Dw = w t -w t-1 and De = e t -e t-1 (t = 2, ..., 10) . A rejected wage offer was counted as e = 0. No. of r is used for the measure-for-measure criteria explained below.
"Imitation" comprises those subjects who are likely to have imitated reciprocity despite their egoistic motivation. Of course, there remains the possibility that some subjects acted egoistically without adopting the sophisticated strategy of imitating reciprocity. They choose e* at least in period 10 but are not expected to have a significant Spearman rank correlation coefficient. These subjects are described by the following criterion:
Selfishness Criterion 3 ("Egoism (RG)"). A person is classified as an egoist if her Spearman rank correlation between wage and effort is statistically insignificant at the 1-percent level and if she chooses an effort level of e* in period 10.
All information to determine types according to criteria "Reciprocity (RG)", "Imitation" and "Egoism (RG)" is documented in Table 4 . The resulting share of types is summarized in Table 5 . According to criterion "Imitation" the share of selfish workers in the RG-treatment is 20 percent.
Twenty-four percent of the workers are less sophisticated egoists according to our Selfishness Criterion 3. These results are remarkable for three reasons: First, reciprocity is a dominant behavioural pattern in our experiment. Second, the share is rather similar across two different treatments. This finding suggests that repeated game incentives have not significantly altered reciprocal inclinations. Third, in reputation models usually only a "small" number of, e.g., "tit-for-tat" -or cooperatively motivated players -is needed to provide the possibility to develop a favourable reputation for a vast majority of rational egoists. Our results show that actual numbers are quite the reverse in the sense that reciprocal people make up the majority and the egoists are a minority. The presence of a large number of reciprocators makes it easy for the egoists to imitate reciprocity. Hence, the repeated game incentives have left intact the reciprocal motivations of the genuine reciprocator and actually disciplined the selfish subjects. These facts together may explain the observed "crowding in" of reciprocity.
Robustness. How robust are our results as summarised in Table 5 with respect to the measurement of reciprocity? To check this we use a measure of reciprocity that accounts for the fact of a permanent relationship in the RG-treatment. This "robustness-criterion" measures how effort choices respond to a change in wages. Specifically, we determine the sign of Dw = w t -w t-1 and of De = e t -e t-1 (t = 2, ... , 10) . If the two signs of Dw and De are the same, we count the 6 In the RG-treatment subjects 16, 21 and 22 are excluded. These workers cannot be classified according to our criteria since they either got no offer or an offer of 20 in the last period. It is an interesting question whether the different types of players had different earnings. However, no systematic picture evolves. Classified according to our criteria the workers earned on average the following income: 34.2 (Reciprocity OS); 34.6 (Reciprocity RG); 35.2 (Egoism OS); 39.6 (Egoism RG); 23.9 (Imitation).
corresponding effort choice as reciprocal. Therefore, it can be viewed as a "measure-formeasure"-criterion of reciprocity (see Selten, Mitzkewitz and Uhlich (1997) Our "Measure-for-Measure"-criterion of reciprocity generates 56 percent reciprocal subjects, which is very similar to the results of the other two reciprocity criteria. Moreover, the concordance of who is singled out to be reciprocal or not according to "Reciprocity (RG)" and "Measure-for-Measure" is 86 percent (see Table 4 ). Our determination of reciprocal workers therefore turns out to be very robust. So far we have talked only about reciprocal workers. In the RG-treatment, however, there is also the possibility that the firms react reciprocally to the workers' effort decisions. The reason why we have focussed on workers' behaviour is twofold. First, since workers can act reciprocally both in the OS-as well as in the RG-treatment a comparison between these two treatments on the basis of individual decisions is possible for workers. This comparison is impossible for firms since in the OS-treatment employers cannot condition their wage decisions on the previous workers' effort decisions. Second, since we are interested in distinguishing genuine reciprocity from imitation we need a criterion that allows us to differentiate imitation from genuine reciprocity. Workers' effort decision in the last period serves that purpose. The final wage decision by firms, however, does not allow such a distinction because even selfish firms may have an incentive to pay generous wages in order to induce non-minimal efforts by reciprocal workers. Since we did not elicit firms' beliefs about workers' reactions we, therefore, cannot conclude much from firms' last round behaviour. Nevertheless it is possible to check whether there is a reciprocal pattern (be it for reasons of imitation or genuine reciprocity) on the side of the firms. To estimate such a relation we constructed a measure-for-measure criterion in the spirit of criteria 3 and 4. Specifically, we determine the sign of De = e t -e t-1 and of Dw = w t+1 -w t . If the two signs of De and Dw are the same, we count the corresponding effort choice as reciprocal.
Notice that this criterion allows a maximum of 8 reciprocal responses for each employer.
Employers chose a reciprocal response in 32.6 percent of the cases. 
The Impact of Experience
As described in Section 2, we conducted four trials with "experienced" subjects, two trials after an OS-and two after a RG-treatment. This was done to check whether our findings are robust with respect to learning chances. Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of average wages and efforts in both treatments. The first ten periods are the "inexperienced trials", and the second ten are the "experienced trials". Figure 2 reveals that behaviour is very robust with respect to experience. In particular, there is no tendency -neither in the wage setting nor in the effort choices -that subjects start to play the outcome w* and e*. Notice that mean effort is even higher in the trials with experienced subjects compared to the inexperienced ones. We also checked whether the regression coefficients on effort changed with experience. As it turns out, the propensity to reciprocate in the trials with experienced subjects tends to increase. In fact, the reciprocal relationship is strengthened (the estimated coefficient on wages is 0.0092 and is highly significant (p < 0.0001).
If subjects do learn anything at all in the OS-treatment, it is to become more cooperative and reciprocal. 7 Interestingly, this number is somewhat lower than the corresponding number for workers. Since it is not plausible to assume that our firms are less reciprocally inclined than our workers, there must be another explanation. One possible reason why firms rarely seem to condition their wages on previous efforts might be due to the sequential nature of the game. It may well be that players perceive firms as first movers even in a repeated context. It is their role to initiate reciprocity, which is answered by workers. We thus speculate that while in simultaneous move games Similar things can be said concerning the RG-treatment. Figure 3 reveals that average wages are similar (mean wages are 57.6 and 59.0, respectively) whereas effort levels are even higher compared to the first ten periods (0.47 and 0.52, respectively). Reciprocity seems to be strengthened with experience. The coefficient on wages is 0.0138 (p < 0.0001). Again we observe a rising pattern of effort levels and a sudden decline in period 10. Thus, with experience, backward induction does not start in earlier periods (compare Selten and Stoecker (1986)) .
Figure 2. Average wages and effort with inexperienced and experienced subjects (OStreatment).
At the individual level, we compared for each subject her individual Spearman rank coefficient in the "inexperienced" and the subsequent "experienced trials". A two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject the null hypothesis that these individual Spearman rank coefficients are the same in the "inexperienced" and the "experienced trials" in both the OS-and the RG-treatment. Finally, we tested whether in the "experienced trials" the share of reciprocal types differs from that in the "inexperienced trials". McNemar change tests do not allow rejecting the null hypothesis that the number of subjects classified according to our Reciprocity-and Selfishnesscriteria is the same in the regular and the experience trials. This holds for all our criteria in both the RG-and the OS-treatment. In our view, this is strong evidence in favour of the argument that reciprocity and its imitation are both consistent and behaviourally relevant. Figure 3 documents yet another interesting fact. According to a standard reputation model efforts and wages should show a non-increasing pattern since cooperative behaviour is losing its both players in a repeated interaction may condition their behaviour on the previous period(s) it might be the case that in sequential games this holds predominantly for second movers.
value as the game goes on. In our RG-sessions, however, we observe an increase in wages and efforts. This holds in particular with experienced subjects. This is in stark contrast to observations from repeated as well as one-shot public goods games, or prisoner's dilemma games with simultaneous contribution decisions, where cooperation declines over time. 8 We believe that the dynamic pattern in the RG-treatment can best be understood as being the result of reciprocal cooperation (applied by both the reciprocators and the imitators) combined with a heuristic of "piecemeal trust". Since fine-tuned gift exchanges are possible in our game, this heuristic allows an increasing level of bilateral gift exchanges in the sense that a cooperative experience in the previous period justifies a gradually increased trust move this period. In the final period the imitators drop their disguise and revert to e*, whereas the reciprocators continue to reciprocate.
Concluding Remarks
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in labour relations (see, e.g., Agell (1999) ). However, an equally important observation on labour relations is their long-term character, i.e., employer and employee play a repeated game. Understanding how social norms and repeated game incentives interact is of an importance that extends beyond the labour relation (see, e.g., the extensive discussion in Bowles (1998) ).
In our data we find that both reciprocity and "reputation" (or, more general, repeated game effects) contribute to increased effort levels relative to the inefficient reference outcome. Average effort levels are considerably higher in the RG-treatment than in the OS-treatment. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, i.e., a positive wage-effort relationship. However, it is steeper in the RG-than in the OS-treatment. Hence, it appears that the social norm of reciprocity and repeated game incentives are complementary forces. Together reciprocity and repeated game incentives have a considerable efficiency-enhancing effect on performance despite contractual incompleteness.
9 This observation is robust with respect to experience.
In our view, these results contribute to the debate on performance incentives in the presence of incomplete contracts. Our results show that a repeated interaction is in itself a suitable contract enforcement device, because there actually are behaviourally relevant repeated game incentives that prevent workers from inefficiently low performance. We believe that a reason for the success of a repeated interaction is its compatibility with a genuine reciprocal inclination that is exhibited by many people. As our individual data analysis reveals this is due to 8 See, e.g., Croson (1996) , and Keser and van Winden (2000) for public goods games and Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper et al. (1996) for simultaneous prisoner's dilemma games. 9 It should be noted though that efficient trading between two parties might be detrimental for third parties. In the labour market fair wage-effort relations may result in involuntary unemployment (see, e.g., Akerlof (1982) ). In organizations, reciprocity might lead to collusive behaviour among agents and to bureaucratisation (Martimort (1997) ).
the fact that the repeated game incentives leave many subjects' genuine reciprocal motivations intact and, moreover, discipline the "egoists" (because they have an incentive to "imitate reciprocity"). As Fehr and Gächter (2000) show, such "reciprocity-compatibility" is a feature that is by no means guaranteed by other incentive schemes. In the experiments of Fehr and Gächter (2000) the incentive device of an announced wage reduction in case of detected shirking, led -in contrast to our observed "crowding in" of reciprocity -to an almost complete "crowding out" of reciprocity 10 . This contrast may help explain why many firms dispense with high-powered incentive schemes and fare better with repeated game incentives and reciprocity alone. Our results are also relevant for the way the labour relation, or, more generally, repeated games with incomplete contracts are viewed. For example, MacLeod and Malcomson (1998, p. 390) argue that in an infinitely repeated labour relation with incomplete contracts "the existence of a self-enforcing agreement that sustains equilibrium depends on a convention such as fairness (…) that prevents wages being bid down". Our findings on the role of reciprocity in our repeated game support this. The behavioural features observed in our experiment should make it easy to sustain a particular fairness norm.
1.
Each firm receives 120 coupons from the experimenters which the firm may use to pay for wages. If the firm makes a wage bid of 120 Guilders, the firm will have no income coupons left. If a firm offers a wage of 20 Guilders, the firm will have 100 income coupons left. In general, the firm will have 120 coupons -wage income coupons left.
2.
How are the remaining income coupons converted into Guilders? The number of coupons retained by the firm whose wage offer you accepted is multiplied by the quantity of work you choose. This result is the income of your firm in Guilders. Thus: Firm's income in Guilders = coupons retained ´ quantity of work
3.
If you do not accept a wage offer of a firm, this firm will earn nothing during that period.
Please note:
The income of all workers and firms will be computed according to the same rules. Every firm has 120 coupons and the work related cost-schedule as well as the travel costs are the same for every worker. Every worker is able to compute the income of "his" firm and every firm is able to compute the income of the firm's worker.
Let's have an exercise!
1.
Let's assume that a firm, who has 120 coupons, offers you a wage of 110 Guilders. A.
You do not accept! What will your income and the income of "your" firm be?
My Let's assume that a firm, who has 120 coupons, offers you a wage of 28 Guilders: A.
My 
________________________________________________________________

General Information for Firms
This general information was the same as for workers and is therefore omitted here.
Let's have an Exercise!
1.
Let's assume that you make a wage offer of 110 Guilders to a worker. A.
The worker does not accept! What will your income and the income of "your" worker be? Workers will choose one of the feasible amounts of work from the first row. The higher the number the higher the amount of work. The second row of the schedule shows the cost of each amount of work for the worker. The higher the amount of work the higher the costs to the worker.
